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This memorandum explores when a court may hold a creditor in civil contempt for
violating a discharge order. Part I analyzes the legal standard for holding a creditor in civil
contempt for violating a discharge order. Part II analyzes common law principles of civil
contempt and how these principles both grant and limit the power of courts to use civil contempt
through their incorporation into the Bankruptcy Code. Part III examines subsequent decisions to
see how courts have applied the new standard for civil contempt for violating a discharge order.
Discussion
I.

The Bankruptcy Code Provides Statutory Authority for Courts to Hold Creditors in
Civil Contempt for Violating a Discharge Order through 11 U.S.C. §§ 524(a)(2) and
105.
A. A Debtor is Generally Entitled to a Discharge Under 11 U.S.C. § 727. Certain Debts are
Excepted from Discharge Under 11 U.S.C. §§ 523(a)(1)-(19).

Pursuant to section 727 of the Bankruptcy Code “the court must grant a discharge to a
chapter 7 debtor unless one or more of the specific grounds for denial of a discharge enumerated
in paragraphs (1) through (12) of section 727(a) is proven to exist.”6 The language of section
727(b) provides the effects of a discharge:
Except as provided in section 523 of this title, a discharge under subsection (a) of
this section discharges the debtor from all debts that arose before the date of the
order for relief under this chapter, and any liability on a claim that is determined
under section 502 of this title as if such claim had arisen before the commencement
of the case, whether or not a proof of claim based on any such debt or liability is
filed under section 501 of this title, and whether or not a claim based on any such
debt or liability is allowed under section 502 of this title.7
Through the Bankruptcy Code, Congress has delineated which debts are excepted
from discharge. Section 523(a) of the Bankruptcy Code expressly excepts various
categories of debts from discharge.8 There are 21 categories of debts that are excepted

6 COLLIER ON BANKRUPTCY ¶ 727.01[1] (Matthew Bender & Co., Inc. eds., 16th ed. 2019).
11 U.S.C. § 727(b) (a discharge in a chapter 7 case discharges an individual debtor from all debts if the debts are
not excepted from discharge under section 523).
8 See 11 U.S.C. § 523(a).
6
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from discharge under 11 U.S.C. §§ 523(a)(1)-(19). These enumerated categories include
debts for taxes, debts for domestic support obligations, and debts obtained by fraud, false
pretenses, or a false representation, among others.9
B. A Discharge Operates as a Legal Injunction Under 11 U.S.C. § 524(a)(2).

For debts that are not excepted from discharge, under 11 U.S.C. § 524(a)(2), a
discharge order “operates as an injunction against the commencement or continuation of
an action, the employment of process, or an act, to collect, recover, or offset” a
discharged debt.10 A discharge order provides a broad injunction against not only legal
proceedings, but also any other acts to collect a discharged debt as a personal liability of
the debtor, even if discharge of the debt has been waived.11 A discharge injunction is the
equivalent of a court order, and as such, any violation of the injunction can be sanctioned
as contempt of court.12
C. Bankruptcy Courts May Hold a Creditor in Civil Contempt for Violating a Discharge
Order.

Under section 105 of the Bankruptcy Code, a court is authorized to “issue any
order, process, or judgment that is necessary or appropriate to carry out the provisions of
this title.”13 This section is “an omnibus provision phrased in such general terms as to be
the basis for a broad exercise of power in the administration of a bankruptcy case.”14
When read together, section 524(a)(2) and section 105 denote that a discharge
order operates as an injunction and a court may issue any order or judgment that is

See 11 U.S.C. §§ 523(a)(1)-(19).
11 U.S.C. § 524(a)(2).
11 See Solow v. Kalikow (In re Kalikow), 602 F.3d 82, 94 (2d Cir. 2010); see also 6 COLLIER ON BANKRUPTCY ¶
524.02[2] (a discharge order extends to all forms of collection activity, including letters, phone calls, threats of
criminal proceedings or other adverse actions intended to bring about repayment).
12 See id.
13 11 U.S.C. § 105.
14 2 COLLIER ON BANKRUPTCY ¶ 105.01 (the purpose of section 105 is to assure the bankruptcy courts power to take
whatever action is appropriate or necessary in aid of the exercise of their jurisdiction).
9
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necessary to carry out other bankruptcy provisions.15 This includes holding a creditor in
civil contempt.16 The text of the Bankruptcy Code clearly supports this notion.17
II.

Bankruptcy Courts do not have Unlimited Authority to Hold a Creditor in Civil
Contempt for Violating a Discharge Order

While the Bankruptcy Code gives courts the ability to hold a creditor in civil
contempt for violating a discharge order, the courts do not have unlimited authority to
hold creditors in civil contempt.18 Civil contempt is a severe remedy and brings with it
“the ‘old soil’ that has long governed how courts enforce injunctions.”19 “[T]he
bankruptcy statutes incorporate the traditional standards in equity practice for
determining when a party may be held in civil contempt for violating an injunction.”20
The traditional civil contempt principles apply to the bankruptcy discharge context, and
as such, courts are limited by these principles in holding creditors in civil contempt.21
When a statutory term is transplanted from another legal source, whether the
common law or other legislation, it “brings the old soil with it.”22 Civil contempt in the
bankruptcy context brings with it the “old soil” of the common law.23 Under the common
law, the standard for civil contempt is generally an objective one, and “[t]he absence of
willfulness does not relieve from civil contempt.”24 Moreover, civil contempt is a severe

See Taggart v. Lorenzen, 139 S.Ct. at 1801.
See id.
17 See id.; see also 11 U.S.C. § 524(a)(2); 11 U.S.C. § 105.
18 See Taggart v. Lorenzen, 139 S.Ct. at 1801.
19 Id.
20 Id.
21 See id. at 1802.
22 Hall v. Hall, 138 S.Ct. 1118, 1128 (2018) (finding where a rule contained no definition of “consolidate,” the term
carried forward the same meaning ascribed to it under the consolidation statute for 125 years).
23 See International Longshoremen's Ass'n v. Philadelphia Marine Trade Ass'n, 389 U.S. 64, 76 (1967) (“The
judicial contempt power is a potent weapon. When it is founded upon a decree too vague to be understood, it can be
a deadly one.”).
24 See McComb v. Jacksonville Paper Co., 336 U.S. 187, 191 (1949) (as the purpose of civil contempt is remedial, it
does not matter “with what intent the defendant did the prohibited act.”).
15
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remedy, and as such, “should not be resorted to where there is fair ground of doubt as to
the wrongfulness of the defendant's conduct.”25
Accordingly, the standard for civil contempt in the bankruptcy context is an
objective one, and “a court may hold a creditor in civil contempt for violating a discharge
order if there is no fair ground of doubt as to whether the order barred the creditor's
conduct.”26 Simply put, “civil contempt may be appropriate if there is no objectively
reasonable basis for concluding that the creditor's conduct might be lawful.”27 It follows
that a court may refrain from holding creditors in contempt if there was an objectively
reasonable basis for concluding that the creditor’s conduct might be lawful.
Additionally, as Congress has carefully delineated which debts are excepted from
discharge under section 523(a)(1)-(19), “civil contempt may be appropriate when the
creditor violates a discharge order based on an objectively unreasonable understanding of
the discharge order or the statutes that govern its scope.”28 This language essentially
mirrors section 727(b).29
Regardless, the limit of bankruptcy courts to hold a creditor in civil contempt for
violating a discharge is clear. A bankruptcy court may hold a creditor in civil contempt if
there is no objectively reasonable basis for concluding that the creditor’s conduct might
be lawful. Also, a bankruptcy court may refrain from holding a creditor in civil contempt
if there is an objectively reasonable basis that the creditor’s conduct might be lawful.
Willfulness and good faith will not preclude a finding of civil contempt. Courts have
already begun to apply and interpret this fair ground of doubt standard.

California Artificial Stone Paving Co. v. Molitor, 113 U.S. 609, 618 (1885).
Taggart v. Lorenzen, 139 S.Ct. at 1799.
27 Id.
28 Id. at 1802.
29 See 11 U.S.C. § 727(b) (a discharge in a chapter 7 case discharges a debtor from all debts if the debts are not
excepted from discharge under section 523).
25
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III.

A Court May Hold a Creditor in Civil Contempt for Violating a Discharge
Order if there is no Fair Ground of Doubt as to Whether the Order Barred the
Creditor’s Conduct.

Under the fair ground of doubt standard, a bankruptcy court may hold a creditor
in civil contempt if there is no objectively reasonable basis for concluding that the
creditor’s conduct might be lawful.30 In In re Jackson, the court applied this standard and
awarded the debtor attorneys' fees totaling $6,725.88 for the respondents’ violation of the
discharge injunction pursuant to sections 524(a) and 105(a).31 The court held that civil
contempt was appropriate as respondents’ counsel's belief was objectively unreasonable
given the record of the case.32
In applying the fair ground of doubt standard, the court looked at several factors.
One key factor was that despite requests from debtor’s counsel, respondents continued
prosecuting appeals of a judgment in the Appeals Court of Massachusetts until the entry
of the Discharge Violation Order, explaining that it was their belief that the claims on
appeal had been excepted from discharge under section 523(a)(1)-(19).33 The court listed
an extensive number of instances where respondents could have sought clarification from
the court with respect to the dischargeability of the claims on appeal.34
The court opined that respondents’ conduct “[did] not reflect an unintended or
technical violation of the Debtor’s discharge, but rather a deliberate attempt to further
pursue a discharged claim without actively assuring themselves that pursuit of the claims
was permitted.”35 Moreover, civil contempt may have been appropriate here based on

See Taggart v. Lorenzen, 139 S.Ct. at 1799.
See Jackson v. DeJesus (In re Jackson), Case No. 15-21233 (AMN), 2020 Bankr. LEXIS 367, at *11 (Bankr. D.
Conn. Feb. 12, 2020).
32 See id. at 7.
33 See id. at 6-7.
34 See id. at 7 (even after confirmation of debtor’s chapter 11 plan and payment of respondents’ proofs of claim in
full, respondents continued their litigation against the debtor).
35 Id. at 7-8.
30
31
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respondents’ counsel’s objectively unreasonable understanding of section 523(a)(1)-(19).
However, it was respondents’ counsel’s failure to seek clarification that ultimately made
their belief objectively unreasonable and subjected them to civil contempt.36
Similarly, courts have begun to determine what objectively reasonable bases in
violation of a discharge order may be tenable under the fair ground of doubt standard.
One case that illustrates this point is In re Orlandi, where the court upheld that the
defendants violated the discharge injunction by filing a state court complaint seeking
liability based on the debtor's pre-petition personal guaranty where they had notice of the
bankruptcy prior to their filing.37
In applying the fair ground of doubt standard, the court considered two main
factors, the first being a split of controlling authority. The defendants argued that any
violation of the discharge injunction was not willful because the bankruptcy court had
never addressed the issue before, there was no controlling case law in the Sixth Circuit,
and the most analogous cases had caused a split of opinion among other courts.38
The court actually agreed, in part, and reversed the bankruptcy court's ruling that
the defendants willfully violated the discharge injunction.39 The court found that there
was a clear split of authority as to whether a pre-petition guaranty was discharged and
that there was no controlling law in the Sixth Circuit on the issue.40 As such, there was a
reasonable basis for the defendants to have concluded that filing the state court action
might be lawful.41

See id. at 7.
See Orlandi v. Leavitt Family Ltd. P’ship (In re Orlandi), No. 19-8001, 2020 U.S. App. LEXIS 6181, at *18, 22
(B.A.P. 6th Cir. Feb. 28, 2020).
38 See id. at 18.
39 See id. at 22.
40 See id. at 21.
41 Id. at 21-22 (although the willful violation of the discharge injunction was reversed, the court noted that “[n]ow
that it is clear to the defendants that the debtor’s liability under the guaranty is no longer enforceable, it should go
36
37
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The second factor considered by the court was the findings of the bankruptcy
court.42 The bankruptcy court had specifically stated that the defendants’ conduct might
be lawful, and as such, the court found that the defendants had not willfully violated the
discharge injunction and that there was a fair ground of doubt.43 However, willfulness
and good faith could not preclude a finding of civil contempt, and as such, the court only
reversed the bankruptcy court's ruling that the defendants willfully violated the discharge
injunction.44 This case illustrates that a clear split of controlling authority may constitute
an objectively reasonable basis for concluding that a creditor’s violation of a discharge
order might be lawful.
Courts have also refrained from holding creditors in civil contempt if any
objectively reasonable observer may have acted similarly under the circumstances. In In
re Shuey, the court held that the creditor’s actions were objectively reasonable and not
subject to civil contempt despite that the creditor’s claim was a contingent pre-petition
claim that was discharged and not excepted from the discharge injunction.45
In applying the fair ground of doubt standard, the court considered a number of
factors as to whether there was an objectively reasonable basis for concluding that the
creditor’s conduct might have been lawful. First, the court considered the Opinion on
Remand, which held that under the circumstances, it would be difficult to state with
conviction that there was no fair ground of doubt.46 “In reaching that conclusion that
Creditor had an objectively reasonable basis, the Opinion on Remand cited: (1) Creditor

without saying that the continued prosecution of the state court action at this point would, on a proper showing,
subject them to a contempt finding and damages.”).
42 See id. at 20.
43 See id. at 20, 22 (emphasis added).
44 See id. at 22.
45 See In re Shuey, Case No. 10 BK 27054, 2019 Bankr. LEXIS 3881, at *10, 16 (Bankr. N. D. Ill. Dec. 18, 2019).
46 See id. at 10-11.
American Bankruptcy Institute Law Review | St. John’s School of Law, 8000 Utopia Parkway, Queens, NY 11439

had legal support for his position that similar claims were held to be excepted from
discharge; and (2) Creditor found support for his position in earlier decisions of this
case.”47
The creditor’s collection efforts for a discharged debt violated the discharge order,
but the Opinion on Remand held that the creditor had an objectively reasonable basis for
concluding that his collection efforts were lawful.48 The creditor obtained a judgment
holding that he was entitled to full indemnification by the debtor as to any payments he
made under the loans.49 The creditor then moved to collect on a valid, final judgment that
was not challenged, and at the very minimum, there was a fair ground of doubt as to
whether the creditor’s actions were wrongful.50 The court found that under the
circumstances, any objectively reasonable observer may have acted similarly, and as
such, sanctions were not warranted for the creditor’s arguably proper and objectively
reasonable actions.51
Conclusion
A court may hold a creditor in civil contempt for violating a discharge order if
there is no fair ground of doubt as to whether the order barred the creditor's conduct.52
Simply put, “civil contempt may be appropriate if there is no objectively reasonable basis
for concluding that the creditor's conduct might be lawful.”53 It follows that a court may
refrain from holding creditors in contempt if there was an objectively reasonable basis for
concluding that the creditor’s conduct might be lawful. Moreover, Congress has carefully

Id.
See id. at 10 (creditor had legal support that similar claims were held to be excepted from discharge).
49 See id. at 16.
50 See id. (under the objective Taggart standard, sanctions were not warranted for the creditor’s arguably proper
actions).
51 See id. at 16-17.
52 Taggart v. Lorenzen, 139 S.Ct. at 1799.
53 Id.
47
48
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delineated which debts are excepted from discharge under 11 U.S.C. §§ 523(a)(1)-(19),
and as such, “civil contempt may be appropriate when the creditor violates a discharge
order based on an objectively unreasonable understanding of the discharge order or the
statutes that govern its scope.”54 This is the standard for when a court may hold a
creditor, or refrain from holding a creditor, in civil contempt for violating a discharge
order. Subsequent case law may apply and interpret this standard to different results, but
for the foreseeable future, the standard for holding a creditor in civil contempt for
violating a discharge order is an objective one.

54

Id. at 1802.

American Bankruptcy Institute Law Review | St. John’s School of Law, 8000 Utopia Parkway, Queens, NY 11439

